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Ill. PROTECTION AGAINST UNJUST DISCIPLINE:
AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS LONG SINCE COME
THEODORE

J.

ST. ANTOINE*

Introduction

The law seems able to absorb only so many new ideas in a
given area at any one time. In 1967 Professor Lawrence Blades
of Kansas produced a pioneering article in which he decried the
iron grip of the contract doctrine of employment at will, and
argued that all employees should be legally protected against
abusive discharge. 1 The next dozen years witnessed a remarkable reaction. With a unanimity rare, if not unprecedented,
among the contentious tribe of labor academics and labor arbitrators, a veritable Who's Who of those professions stepped
forth to embrace Blades' notion, and to refine and elaborate it
-Aaron, 2 Blumrosen, 3 Howlett, 4 Peck, 5 Stieber, 6 and Summers,7 to name only some. But the persons who ultimately
counted the most, the judges and the legislators, hung back. In
the 1960s the country had taken vast strides, at both the federal 8
and state 9 levels, to stamp out discrimination in employment
based on such invidious and particularized grounds as race, sex,
*Member, National Academy of Arbitrators; Professor of Law, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Mich.
1 Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: Of Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Emp!qyer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404 (1967).
2 Cj. Aaron, Conshtutional Protections Against Unjust Dismissals from Employment: Some Reflections, in New Techniques in Labor Dispute Resolution, ed. Howard]. Anderson (Washington: BNA Books, 1976), 13.
3 Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to 'Just Cause" Protection under Title
I'll, 2 Ind. Reis. L.J. 519 (1978).
4 Howlett, Due Process/or Nor1unionized Employees: A Practical Proposal, in Proceedings of
the 32nd Annual Meetmg, Industrial Relations Research Association, ed. Barbara D.
Dennis (Madison, Wis.: IRRA, 1980), 164.
5 Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 Ohio St. LJ.
I (1979).
6 Stieber, The Case for Protection of Unorganized Employees Against Unjust Discharge, in
Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Meeting, Industrial Relations Research Association, ed.
Barbara D. Dennis (Madison, Wis.: IRRA, 1980), 155.
7 Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 Va. L.Rev.
481 (1976).
8 £.g., Egual Pay Act, 77 Stat. 56 (1963), 29 U.S.C. §206(d) (1976); Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Title VII, 78 Stat. 253 (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1976 & Supp.
II 1978); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 81 Stat. 602 (1967), as amended, 29
U.S.C. §621 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
9 All the states have comprehensive laws against discrimination in employment except
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia. Fair Employment Practices Manual SA (Washington: BNA, 1980), 451:l02-l07.
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religion, national origin, and age. It was as if we needed a pause
to catch our breath before venturing on into more open and
exposed territory. Now, as we enter the 1980s, there are signs
of quickening interest by both courts and legislatures in broader
protections for employees' job interests, and the time seems
ripe for an appraisal of where we have arrived and where we may
be headed.
I see no reason to retrace at length the trail that has been
blazed by my many predecessors. My principal purpose will be
to consider the numerous practical problems that must be resolved if we are to effectuate the concept of protecting employees generally against unjust discipline. First, however, I
shall briefly survey the existing body of law, both here and
abroad, with special emphasis on the significant changes occurring in the United States over the past two decades. Following
that will come a summary of the various major proposals for
dealing with the unfair treatment of employees. Finally, I shall
focus on some concrete suggestions concerning appropriate
procedures and remedies.

Existing Law of Employee Discipline

United States
It is an oft-told tale that the rule making employment arrangements of indefinite duration contracts at will, terminable by
either party at any time, is not a rule which has roots deep in the
English common law, 10 but one which sprang full-blown in 1877
from the busy and perhaps careless pen of an American treatise
writer. 11 However dubious may have been the precedent he
cited, 12 his pronouncement was admirably suited to the zeitgeist
of an emerging industrial nation. Before the nineteenth century
was out, our courts could confidently assert: "All [employers]
may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few, for
good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong,
without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." 13
10 Summers, supra note 7, at 485; Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England
1 (Philadelphia: Robert Bell, 1771), 425-426 (general hiring of menial labor for an
unfixed term presumed to be for a year).
11 Wood, LawofMasterand Servant (Albany, N.Y.:John D. Parsons.Jr., 1877), 272-273.
12 For detailed criticism, see Note, Implied Contract Rights to job Security, 26 Stan. L.Rev.
335, 340-345 (1974).
13 Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-520 (1884).
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Three quite different groups of employees have managed to
escape these harsh strictures. The first consists of the minuscule
handful of persons whose knowledge or talents are so unusual
and valuable that they have the leverage to negotiate a contract
for a fixed term with their employer. Second, over half of the
approximately 15 million employees of federal, state, and local
governments are protected by tenure arrangements or other
civil service procedural devices. 14 The third category, of course,
is composed of the workers covered by collective bargaining
agreements, 80 percent of which expressly prohibit discharge or
discipline except for "cause" or "just cause." 15 Union membership in the United States, however, has now declined to less than
20 percent of the total labor force. 16 We may thus assume that
something like three-quarters of our 100-million workforce operates under contracts at will. Extrapolating from such figures
and from the arbitration records of the American Arbitration
Association and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
Cornelius Peck has estimated that at least 12,000 to 15,000
nonunion workers are discharged or disciplined annually whose
cases would have been arbitrated if they had been subject to a
collective agreement. 17 About half these disciplinary actions
would presumably have been found unjustified. Perhaps even
more important, Peck suggests that as many as 300,000 disciplinary cases a year arising in the nonunionized sector might have
been subjected to negotiation and possible settlement if mandatory grievance procedures had been available. Jack Stieber calculates that about one million private industry employees with
more than six months service are fired in a typical year without
recourse to grievance and arbitration procedures. 18 He thinks
that about 50,000 would be reinstated if they could appeal to
impartial tribunals. 19 The gravity of the problem needs no further elaboration.
The first significant inroads on the doctrine of contract at will
were made in situations where employers had retaliated against
14 Peck, supra
15 /d.. at 8.
16 Bureau of

note 5, at 8-9.

Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics-I 978, Bull. No. 2000
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 507; New York Times.July 13,
I 980, §3, p. I, col. I.
17 Peck, supra note 5, at 10.
18Stieber, supra note 6, at 160.
. 19 Letter from Jack Stieber to author, dated April 29, 1981. The estimate will appear
m a forthcommg article, and is based on extrapolations from figures in the unionized
sector.
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employees for exercising their civil rights or declining to act
unlawfully. These included cases where workers were fired for
serving on a jury, 20 for filing a workers' compensation claim, 21
or even for refusing to give perjured testimony. 22 Plainly, such
egregious instances of retaliatory discipline enabled the courts
to invoke overarching concepts of "public policy" without
reaching the question of whether an employer needed a positive
justification for his action. They were akin to decisions that,
while a landlord may ordinarily evict a tenant at the end of a
lease for any reason or for no reason, he may not evict because
the tenant has filed charges under the housing code. 23 Even so,
right through the 1960s and 1970s other courts continued to
apply the contract-at-will principle with full rigor. A secretary's
discharge was sustained, for example, when she went against her
immediate supervisor's order and indicated her availability for
jury service, even though a senior partner in the firm had said
she should do her civic duty. 24 And a court left untouched the
dismissal of a long-time salesman for a steel manufacturer because he complained to his superiors and ultimately to a company vice president, justifiably as it later proved, that a new
tubular casing could seriously endanger anyone using it. 25
Another breakthrough occurred in Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 26 when the New Hampshire Supreme Court extended the
concept of retaliatory discharge to an action on an oral employment contract for an indefinite term. A female worker had been
fired after rejecting her foreman's sexual advances. The court
concluded:
"We hold that a termination by the employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based
on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic system or
the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract. " 27

Monge may be said to go beyond the earlier retaliation cases
because it did not involve the assertion of a statutory right
2 0Nees

v. Hocks, 272 Ore. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
v. Teamsters Local 396, l 74 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25, 44 LRRM 2968

21 Sventko

22 Petermann

(1959).
23 See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d687 (D.C.Cir. 1968),cert. den. 393 U.S. 1016(1969).
24 Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960).
25 Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171,319 A.2d 174 (1974).
26114 N.H. 130,316 A.2d 549 (1974).
27 Id., at l 33.
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or other clearly enunciated public policy. It stops short, however, of imposing any affirmative obligation on an employer to
demonstrate a reasonable basis for adverse personnel action.
Michigan edged closer to a broader requirement ofjust cause
for discharge in certain circumstances with its two 1980 decisions in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan and Ebling
v. Masco Corporation. 28 Toussaint and Ebling had been employed
in middle management positions for five and two years, respectively. Each had been told upon hiring that he would be employed as long as he "did the job." Toussaint had also been
handed a personnel manual that stated it was company "policy"
to release employees "for just cause only." The court held that
a jury could find that a provision forbidding discharge except for
cause had become part of the indefinite term contracts either by
"express agreement, oral or written," or, in Toussaint's case,
as a result of "legitimate expectations grounded in his employer's written policy statements set forth in the manual of personnel policies. " 29 Although the Michigan approach opens the
door for a court to infer a just cause provision from an employer's overly hearty welcome to sought-after employees, there are
a couple of important qualifications. First, the factual basis
for the inference, by its very nature, is likely to be found only
in dealings with higher level personnel, not rank-and-file workers. Second, the employer can eliminate the protection simply
by refraining from any assurance about the reasons for termination.
A further wrinkle was added by the Supreme Court of California in Tameny v. Atlantic Rich.field Co. 30 An employee alleged he
had been discharged for refusing to participate in an illegal
scheme to fix retail gasoline prices. The court held that the
plaintiff could sue not only in contract but also in tort for a
wrongful act committed in the course of the contractual relationship. The practical significance of this is that the employee
is entitled to pursue compensatory tort and punitive damages,
which are not generally available in contract actions. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has also sustained a cause of action
408 Mich. 579,.292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
at 598-599. Accord: Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. App.
1980); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. App. 1981). See also Fortune v.
National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (duty of fair dealing).
30 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1980).
28

29 Id.,
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in both tort and contract when an employee is discharged for
"refusing to perform an act that violates a clear mandate of
public policy." 31
Despite these salutary developments, however, the blunt reality is that even in the most enlightened American jurisdictions,
unorganized private employers need make no positive showing
of cause before ridding themselves of an unwanted employee.

Western Europe
The story is quite different concerning job terminations in
most of the rest of the industrial world. The International Labor
Organization recommended in 1963 that there should be a
"valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity
or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements [of the employer]." 32 Protection against unfair discharge
is afforded by statute in all Common Market countries and in
Sweden and Norway. 33
"Unfair" is variously defined, but the differences in
phraseology seem to indicate little if any difference in meaning. 34 An American arbitrator would not feel uncomfortable
applying the standards. Ordinarily, there must be advance notice for a discharge, but summary dismissal may be allowed for
"flagrant" misconduct or "urgent cause." The burden of proving a "fair" discharge generally rests on the employer. Compensation for periods that vary from country to country is the usual
remedy for an unfair dismissal. Reinstatement is rarely authorized and even more rarely employed.
The common pattern in Western Europe is to try discharge
cases before specialized labor courts or industrial tribunals. 35
Typically these are tripartite, with a professional judge or legally
trained individual serving as chairman, and with laypersons
drawn from the ranks of employers and employees serving as
associates.
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 NJ. 58,417 A.2d 505 (1980).
No. 119, Employer Discipline: 1.L.O. Report, 18 Rutgers L.Rev. 446,449
(1964).
33 Stieber, supra note 6, at 157-159; see also Summers, supra note 7, at 509-519.
Canadian employees covered by the federal Labour Code are also protected. Howlett,
supra note 4, at 166.Japan and many other non-European countries provide protection
as well. Committee Report, At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 The
Record 170, I 75 (1981).
34 Stieber, supra note 6, at 157-159; Summers, supra note 7, at 509-519.
35 Summers, supra note 7, at 510-519.
31

32 Recommendation
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Proposals for Ensuring "Just Cause"

At this late date I take it as a given that employees, generally,
should be protected, generally, against unjust discipline. Anyone not convinced about this premise is commended to the
writings of the illustrious band I have previously cited. 36 But the
consensus on objective is not matched by any consensus on
means.
To begin with, there is a dispute over the appropriate theory
to employ. Blades in his seminal article thought that contract
doctrine was so weighted down with the baggage of mutuality
of obligation and consideration that it should be shelved in favor
of the "more elastic principles" of tort law. 37 Most of the early
decisions upholding an employee's cause of action for "abusive
discharge" did indeed proceed on the basis of a prima facie
tort. 38 Moreover, tort law has the advantage of permitting a
wider range of remedies, including punitive damages where appropriate. Yet tort law, grounded as it is in rather nebulous
notions of "public policy," has inherent limitations. Often a
judge will not be persuaded that an individual injury has risen
to the height of an offense against public policy-witness the
case of the hapless steel salesman. 39 More fundamentally, public
policy may be too coarse a net to catch the more personalized
wrong; how should we classify the unwanted overtures of the
macho foreman? 4 0
Responding to these concerns, a number of commentators
have argued that the action should sound in contract rather than
tort. Thus, Professor John Blackburn of Ohio State contends
that implying a right not to be discharged without good cause
would actually conform to the probable intent of the parties to
the employment relation. 41 It would also enlarge the scope of
employee protection, extending redress to any dismissal not
supported by cause instead of restricting relief to malicious or
abusive discharges. Blackburn even views the loss of punitive
damages as a gain for healthy personnel relations, since he believes the goal should be a make-whole remedy and not a com3 6 See

notes 1-7, supra.

3 7 B!ades, supra note I, at
38 See cases cited in notes

1422.
20-22, supra.
9See note 25, supra.
4 0See note 26, supra.
41
Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment at Will,
17 Amer. Bus. LJ. 467,482 (1980).
3
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bined penalty and windfall. Monge, the case of the rebuffed
foreman, relied on an implied contract theory, and Toussaint,
involving oral assurances and written personnel policies,
seemed to intermingle express and implied contract.
I see no reason for having to choose between tort and contract
law. Either or both would seem appropriate, as the occasion
warrants. For me the more important questions are whether we
seek common law or statutory solutions and what kinds of tribunals, procedures, and remedies we ought to provide. Here, too,
there is disagreement. Summers, for example, is satisfied that
the courts are unwilling "to break through their self-created
crust of legal doctrine," 42 and that we must look to the legislatures for the vindication of employees' rights. Peck, on the other
hand, believes legislation is so much the product of organized
interest groups that almost by definition unorganized workers
are an ineffective lobby and must turn to the courts for redress.43
Both these assessments contain a good deal of truth. With the
benefit of several years' extra hindsight and the further perspective provided by the 1980-1981 decisions from California, Michigan, and New Jersey, I am prepared to say that it is not at all
impossible a solution will be fashioned by the judiciary. But the
courts are likely to be long on generalization and short on detail
when it comes to spelling out procedures, remedies, and the
like. At the same time, even though the legislatures may not wish
to take the initiative for a whole fistful of understandable political reasons, they may be goaded into action by the boldness of
some courts. Furthermore, it is entirely conceivable that at some
point employers themselves might support legislation on the
ground the compromises and greater exactness of a statutory
solution are preferable to the broad strokes and blurred outlines
often produced by an innovative judiciary. The upshot may be
that in a number of states the process will go through two stages.
The first few steps, halting, tentative, or even blundering, will
be taken by the courts, and then the legislatures will be almost
compelled to move in and provide a more definitive blueprint.
A critical factor in securing legislative relief may be the attitude of organized labor. It is about the only interest group one
can identify that might be willing to take the lead in promoting
42 Summers, supra note 7, at 521.
43Peck, supra note 5, at 3.
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such a cause. A common assumption, however, is that unions
will not favor legislation protecting employees against arbitrary
treatment by employers because it will eliminate or detract from
one of the unions' prime selling-points in their efforts to organize the unorganized. I cannot deny this possibility, but I think
it would be as short-sighted as was organized labor's initial
hostility toward the Fair Labor Standards Act. 44 First, and not
insignificantly, organized labor could profit considerably from
refurbishing its image as the champion of the disadvantaged.
Second, and perhaps more practically, a universal rule against
dismissal without cause should actually prove beneficial to
unions in their organizing drives. Now, when a union sympathizer is fired in the middle of a campaign, it must be established
by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she would not
have been discharged but for the exercise of rights protected by
the Labor Act. 45 That is frequently a burden too heavy to bear.
With ajust cause requirement generally applicable, it would be
up to the employer to show that some positive, acceptable basis
existed for the discharge. Finally, I believe there is a strong
likelihood thatjust cause standards will act more as a spur than
a hindrance to union organizing. The promise of fair treatment
will be held out to employees; the promise may remain a tantalizing and unrealized dream, however, unless there is present
the means to actualize it. Constant, effective representation and
advocacy is the surest way to ensure any right. That is the lesson
for unions and the unorganized to heed.
In addition to the possible reservations of organized labor,
some neutrals in industrial relations might oppose a statutory
just cause requirement for fear that it would erode such worthy
values as voluntarism, private initiative, and creativity, and more
particularly the collective bargaining process itself. I, too, treasure the unique American institution of union-employer bargaining, but when even so hardheaded an observer as John
Dunlop can be found rhapsodizing on its "beauty," 46 I think we
should all be wary about being carried away by the mystique of
the process. Collective bargaining, after all, is a means and not
an end. The objective is the betterment of the individual work44 Dulles,

45 Mzller

Labor in America (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1960), 283-285.

Elec. Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 225, 43 LRRM 225 (7th Cir. 1959); NLRB
v. West Point Mfg. Co., 245 F.2d 783, 40 LRRM 2234 (5th Cir. 1957); cf. Wright Line, 251

NLRB No. 150, 105 LRRM 1169 (1980).
46
Dunlop, The Social Utility of Collective Bargaining, in Challenges to Collective Bargaining, ed. Lfoyd Ulman (Englewood Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 168, 173.
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ing person. When less than a quarter of the labor force is currently afforded protection against unjust discipline, I feel the
needs of the other three-quarters outweigh some theoretical risk
to traditional bargaining processes. Even then, assuming history
is any guide, we underrate the flexibility and resilience of collective bargaining if we believe it cannot adapt to, and indeed
exploit, a new legal environment.
Statutory Arbitration
If employees are to be fully and effectively protected against
unjust discipline, new specialized legislation will eventually be
necessary. The judiciary, as we have seen, may be able to respond to extreme cases and to the atypical situations of middlemanagement personnel. But the courts have no capacity to construct an administrative apparatus for enforcement purposes,
and their more formalized processes are not readily accessible
to rank-and-file workers. Nor do I see much hope, as do Peck47
and Blumrosen, 48 in either the Constitution or existing civil
rights legislation. To me the former route seems barred by the
courts' increasing reluctance to expand the "state action" concept,49 and the latter by the need to accord some modicum of
respect to the legislative intent to forbid job discrimination only
on the specified bases of "race, sex, religion, national origin,
age," and the like. 50 It comes down, then, to a matter of further
legislation. A federal statute would seem foredoomed in this
period of national retrenchment. State legislation appears more
promising, and it offers the additional advantage of the opportunity for some healthy experimentation with alternative procedures. During the past few years bills have been drafted in such
states as Connecticut, 51 Michigan, 52 and New Jersey 53 to provide
"just cause" protection to unorganized workers. In the remainder of this paper I shall consider some of the principal issues
almost any statutory proposal will have to confront. Obviously,
there will often be substantial values in competition, and more
47 Peck,

supra note 5, at 26--42.
supra note 3.

48 Blumrosen,
49 See,

e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).

50 See

text at note 8, supra.
Comm. Bill No. 5151 (1975).
52 At the time of writing, Michigan Representative Perry Bullard had completed the
fourth draft of a proposed bill and was planning to introduce it shortly.
53 NJ. Assembly Bill No. 1832 (1980).
51 Conn.

ARBITRATION OF joB SECURITY

53

than one choice could be supported. My own suggestions will try
to take account of both the ideal and the politically feasible.

'Just Cause" Standard
The first question can be disposed of the easiest. The statute
should articulate a standard for lawful discharge or discipline in
terms of ''just cause" or equivalent language, without further
definition. Even in Western European countries having nothing
like the body of American arbitral precedent interpreting ''just
cause" requirements, there has apparently been little difficulty
in applying broadly phrased statutory criteria. Any effort at
specification is bound to risk underinclusiveness. The decisionmakers can be counted on to flesh out ''just cause" in the same
way as have the arbitrators.
The statute should probably remain discreetly silent on such
items as the burden and the quantum of proof. The differing
standards that have been applied by public tribunals in job discrimination cases and by private arbitrators under collective
bargaining agreements will tug in opposite directions. Concrete
cases would appear to provide the best vehicle for dealing with
such issues.

Protected Classes of Employees
It is hard to argue in principle that any employee should be
subject to an unjust termination. Still, when one reaches the
presidency of the Ford Motor Company, it does not seem wholly
unfitting that one accepts the risk of being confronted one day
by an announcement from the chairman of the board, 'Tm
getting rid of you because I don't like you." Beyond that, there
are practical reasons for excluding certain classes of employees
from the protection of a statute.
Managers and Supervisors. In the higher ranges of management,
one official's evaluation of another's business judgment may
become so intertwined with questions of fair personal treatment
that the two cannot be separated. That does not reach down to
the level of shop foremen and other supervisors, who are excluded from the organizational protections of the National
Labor Relations Act because they are management's immediate
representatives to rank-and-file employees and any union that
may be bargaining for them. This concern about potential conflicts of interest plainly does not apply to "just cause" legisla-
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tion, and supervisors as such should be covered. More troubling
is the position of middle-management personnel, who are
among the most exposed and vulnerable. Unfortunately, our
lexicon of industrial relations usage does not contain a convenient term distinguishing middle management, whom we
should protect, from higher management, whom we may wish
to exclude. I would suggest pointing the direction with as serviceable a definition as we can muster, and leaving the rest to
interpretation.
Probationary Employees. There is almost a presumption that an
employer will not dismiss an employee unfairly in the early days
of employment-otherwise, why hire? Moreover, the first few
weeks or months of employment enable the employer to size up
the new recruit and assess his or her performance on the job.
On the other hand, it is not until an employee has been part of
an establishment for some measurable time that he can reasonably feel he possesses anything like an equity in his position. For
all these reasons it is generally recognized in collective bargaining agreements and elsewhere that so-called "probationary"
employees are not entitled to just cause protections. Howlett
would make the probation period one year; 54 Summers and the
Michigan and New Jersey bills opt for six months. 55 The latter
seems adequate to me.
Small Employers. Theoretically,job protections should not depend on the size of the employer. Indeed, arbitrariness and
individual spite may well be more common on the part of an
idiosyncratic sole entrepreneur than on the part of a large, structured corporation. Nonetheless, we feel uneasy about intruding
too quickly into the sometimes intensely personal relationships
of small, intimate establishments. There is also concern about
not dissipating our resources in an endless pursuit of minor
culprits instead of concentrating on the major malefactors. A
suitable dividing line, at least at the outset, would seem to be
employers having between ten 56 and fifteen 57 or more employees.
Public Employees. Public employees generally have constitutional guarantees against the deprivation of their "vested" job
5 4 Howlett, supra note 4, at 167.
55 Summers, supra note 7, at 525;

Mich. draft bill, §3(1); NJ. Assembly Bill No. 1832
(1980), § I.
56 Summers, supra note 7, at 526; Mich. draft bill, §3(2).
57 Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e(b).
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interests without due process. Approximately half also have
more specific civil service or tenure protections against unjust
dismissal. At least the latter group, as the Michigan bill proposes, could properly be excluded from any new statutory
procedures. In addition, since American employment legislation
has traditionally differentiated between the public and private
sectors, it may be politically advantageous to maintain that distinction by limiting any new protections to private industry.
Organized Employees. Most of the arguments in favor of just
cause requirements have been phrased in terms of protecting
"unorganized" workers. The Michigan bill expressly excludes
employees "protected" by a union contract. 58 Furthermore,
there is at least some potential for a federal preemption problem
in covering unionized workers, as any state statute would necessarily affect collective bargaining under the NLRA. The risk is
slight, however, since the Supreme Court has taken a liberal
attitude toward state regulation in the areas of employment
discrimination, 59 unemployment compensation, 60 and similar
welfare concerns. 61 The issue must be faced as a matter of policy, then, whether to include workers subject to a collective
bargaining agreement.
Except for the possible conservation oflimited administrative
resources, I see no justifiable grounds for treating organized
employees differently from the unorganized with respect to
basic statutory protections. If we conclude that workers in general are entitled to invoke a just cause standard, the same public
policy should extend to all, regardless of the existence of parallel protections in a collective bargaining agreement. There is
precedent for such an approach in both the NLRA and civil
rights legislation, which clearly extend to workers who are also
covered by antidiscrimination guarantees in their union contracts. 62
For me the difficult question is the proper relationship of
statutory and contractual rights and remedies, when both are
58 Mich. draft bill, §3( 1). New Jersey more specifically limits protection to an employee
"without the benefit of ... a collective bargaining agreement that contains a grievance
procedure covering these matters which terminates in binding arbitration." Assembly
Bill No. 1832 (1980), §1.
59 £.g., Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714, 52
LRRM 2889 (1963).
60 New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dept. ofLabor, 440 U.S. 519, 100 LRRM 2896 (1979).
61 See, e.g., Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 297, 43 LRRM 2374 (1959).
62 Ceneral American Transp. Corp., 228 NLRB No. 102, 94 LRRM 1483 (1977); Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 7 FEP Cases 81 (1974).
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available. Summers would give the contract priority to the extent of requiring a disciplined employee to exhaust the contractual grievance procedure, and would make any arbitral award
that is obtained final and binding. 63 But he would not let the
union enter a binding settlement with the employer, as it now
may do under Vaca v. Sipes, 64 subject only to its duty of fair
representation toward the employee. Instead, if the union declines to arbitrate under the contract, Summers would permit
the employee to proceed on his or her own to the neutral tribunal provided by the state. He believes only "the most stubborn
individual" would persist in the face of the union's settlement.
From my experience with the United Automobile Workers' Public Review Board, I suspect there are more such "stubborn individuals" about than Summers imagines. Otherwise, I find his
conclusions reasonable, but not entirely logical. For example, if
the statutory right is so powerful that the union cannot waive it,
why should not the employee be able, like an employee charging
employer discrimination under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 65
to circumvent the grievance procedure completely, instead of
being compelled to exhaust contractual procedures first? My
own inclination would be to put more trust in the flexibility of
collective bargaining, and to leave some of these questions for
future resolution amidst the counterpoint of particular facts,
negotiated tradeoffs, dollar costs, and the union's overriding
duty of fair representation. I see no reason here to engage in the
same close scrutiny of union, employer, or arbitrator conduct
that may be appropriate in dealing with such sensitive and divisive issues as race and sex discrimination. 66

Discipline Covered
Advocates of employee protection have usually talked about
protection against discharge, the so-called economic "capital
punishment" of industrial relations. That is dramatic. But an
extended suspension, a demotion, a denied promotion, or an
onerous job assignment, while not as blatant, can be almost as
devastating. Such job actions should be regarded as the functional equivalent of discharge. The Michigan bill may be politi63 Summers, supra note 7, at 528.
64 386 U.S. 171, 64 LRRM 2369 (1967).
65

General American Tramp. Corp., supra note 62.
See, e.g., Akxander v. Gardner Denver Co., supra note 62; Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 70 LRRM 2097 (1969).
66
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cally astute in the way it puts the matter, in effect creating a
"constructive discharge," though it requires the employee to
engage in a variation on Russian roulette: "Discharge includes
a resignation or quit that results from an improper or unreasonable action or inaction of the employer." 67
European experience indicates that protections against unjust
discipline will inevitably force inquiries into an employer's handling of "redundancies," that is, layoffs or other employee reassignments to meet economic downturns or reduced production
demands. Otherwise, there is simply too much opportunity to
disguise unfair treatment of an individual employee as part of
an employer's overall reaction to business oscillations. This
hardly imposes an oppressive burden on employers. All they
need do is establish almost any sort of rational, verifiable criterion-seniority, skills, past productivity, etc.-as the basis for
their job determinations, and they are practically impervious to
challenge.

Adjudicators and Procedure
A new statute could pick and choose across a broad spectrum
of possible enforcement devices. Most persons would probably
rule out the courts as too formal, too costly, and already overloaded. Existing administrative agencies, either the labor relations boards or the civil rights commissions, are more likely
candidates. Robert Howlett, the former chairman of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, favors placing administration in the hands of state labor departments. 68 He feels
the hearing officers of the conventional labor relations agencies
are more attuned to organizational than to individual concerns.
He also believes the whole proposal would face less political
opposition if it were divorced from the usual union-employer
regulatory context. My view is that a question like this is best
answered by reference to the governmental structure and industrial relations climate of each state.
More significant, I think, than the locus of administration is
whether we follow the hearing officer-agency model or the arbitration model. I hope I am not merely exhibiting crass professional bias when I join the overwhelming majority of my fellow
arbitrators who have addressed the issue in concluding that
67Mich. draft bill, §2(3).
68 Howlett, supra note 4, at 167.
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arbitration is the superior procedure for "just cause" determinations. Adopting the arbitration format would immediately
make available the vast body of arbitral precedent concerning
substance and procedure that has been developed in countless
decisions over the years. It would permit the use of an established nucleus of experienced arbitrators, and of the growing
number of young, able aspirants who are caught in the vicious
circle of being denied experience because they have no experience. It would facilitate maximum flexibility, at least until more
is learned about future caseloads, because there would be no
need to engage a large permanent staff at the outset. It would
leave open the option, however, of utilizing a mix, as does New
York, of "staff' arbitrators and of free-lancers drawn from a
panel for ad hoc assignments. The relative informality and
speed of arbitration-though both those qualities are now often
much eroded-should also appeal to rank-and-file employees.
Finally, just cause rulings do not call for the minute technical
expertise that may be essential in a permanent hearing officer
specializing in unemployment compensation or Social Security
claims.
Although arbitration is the customary capstone of collectively
bargained grievance procedures, only a small percentage of the
grievances that are filed reach arbitration. Arguably the whole
system would collapse if all claims went to the final step. Most
are settled or dropped along the way. It would seem highly
desirable to have some comparable sieve in the statutory procedure. The most obvious would be a preliminary mediation stage
of minimum duration, and the Michigan bill so provides. 69
Howlett would have an official in the administering agency make
a "reasonable cause" determination before a case could go to
arbitration. 70 I agree such a requirement makes sense, at least
~f the state is to bear the major share of the cost of the proceedmgs.
Another advantage of the arbitral model is that the award is
final and binding, without the need for agency adoption or review as in the case of a hearing officer's report or decision.
Ordinarily, of course, a private arbitration award will not be set
aside by the courts unless the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction or the award was obtained by fraud, collusion, or similar
69 Mich. draft bill, §6(2)
70 Howlett, supra note 4,

(30 days).
at 169.

ARBITRATION OF joB SECURITY

59

means. That ought to be the standard here. Since a statutory
arbitrator is imposed on the parties, however, there may be
considerable pressure to adopt the stiffer "substantial evidence"
standard. Moreover, some state constitutions require that rulings by public agencies and officials be supported by "competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. " 71 If a "substantial evidence" requirement
obtains, one way or the other, it raises the grim prospect of
verbatim transcripts, with all their attendant delays and added
costs. Although some persons seem to eye a tape recorder in a
hearing room the way certain Indians are said to view cameras
-as if cameras were out to capture their souls-the sponsor of
the Michigan bill was persuaded to accept this cheap, handy
device as a sufficient means of documentation, 72 and I should
hope others would follow suit.

Remedies
Arbitrators under labor contracts have demonstrated both
ingenuity and common sense in devising a range of remedies to
counter uajust discharge and other discipline. They have, for
instance, evolved the cardinal principle that the punishment
must fit not only the offense but also the offender. What is
suitable for the short-term employee of spotty record is not right
for the long-time veteran of irreproachable deportment. Presumably statutory arbitrators will temper their judgments accordingly.
More specifically, remedies for unjust discharge in the United
States have traditionally included reinstatement with or without
back pay. In Europe reinstatement is the exception. Apparently
it is felt that the lone, unwanted employee can seldom regain
a comfortable position in his old workplace, and it is better
to award him severance pay and let him go. A number of American experts also seem to believe that reinstatement is unfeasible without the presence of a labor union to support the
restored employee. I think awarding severance pay in lieu
of reinstatement is an option the arbitrator should have. But I
see no reason for precluding reinstatement out of an exaggerated regard for the employee's psychic well-being. American
workers are probably more transient than their European
71 E.g.,

Mich. Const. 1963, Art.VI, §28.
12M1ch. draft bill, § 10(5).
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counterparts, and they are used to handling unfamiliar job
situations. A reinstatement order also gives them extra bargaining leverage in working out any future adjustment with the employer. I would grant reinstatement when it seemed appropriate, and let the employee decide what use to make of the
award.
Costs
The arbitrator's fee and expenses under collectively bargained arrangements are normally shared, 50-50, by the parties,
although occasionally the loser pays all. Each side bears its
own representation costs, if any. A few years ago my former
colleague, Harry Edwards, calculated that the typical one-day
hearing costs a union $2200; 73 that would be a prohibitive
figure for many individual employees, especially those out of
work. Clyde Summers declares that "in principle" under a statutory scheme the state should cover administrative costs and
the arbitrator's fee, just as it bears the expense of courts and
judges. 74 He would allow a nominal filing fee, perhaps $ 100, to
discourage frivolous claims. Howlett would require such a fee
at the point a case is referred to arbitration by a screening
officer. 75
In theory one cannot fault that approach. But there may be
practical problems in implementing it. There is now a strong
tradition in the collective bargaining sector that the parties shall
pay the arbitrator. Although a few states, like Connecticut and
Wisconsin, 76 provide arbitrators at public expense, the trend
has been, in a kind of reversal of Gresham's Law, for privately
paid arbitrators to replace publicly paid arbitrators. Thus, prior
to the Taft-Hartley Act, the old United States Conciliation Service furnished free arbitration through staff personnel. Now, of
course, the FMCS simply offers parties the names of private
arbitrators. New York continues to provide a choice of staff
arbitrators paid by the state and "panel" arbitrators whom the
parties must pay. 77 But Robben Fleming reports that "the
73 Edwards, Probl,ems Facing Arbitration Process, in Labor Relations Yearbook-1977
(Washington: BNA Books, 1978), 206.
74 Summers, supra note 7, at 524.
75 Howlett, supra note 4, at 169.
76 Summers, supra note 7, at 524; Mueller, The Role of the Wisconsin Employment Board
Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L.Rev. 47, 49.
77 Summers, supra note 7, at 522.
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amount of free service is declining by deliberate choice of the
state agency. " 78 The list of private arbitrators is publicized and
the availability of staff personnel is not. Moreover, in a period
of severe financial stringency for many state governments, the
prospect of one more new and perhaps substantial expense is
sure to generate even further opposition to a proposal that is
not going to elicit universal acclaim in any event. The Michigan
bill has heeded the counsel of prudence and provided that the
employer and the employee "shall bear equally" the cost of the
arbitrator. 79
Elite private arbitrators, I regret to have to observe, undoubtedly have a personal interest in this debate over costs. If the state
pays the bill, the state will almost certainly, like Connecticut, set
the rate. 80 That may be fine for fledgling arbitrators, but it may
not be adequate for financing many trips to Maui. I shall leave
to others any necessary development of this somber theme,
expressing only a modest hope that we may comport ourselves
more gracefully and responsibly than some other professions in
the perceived face of rampant socialism.
Conclusion
Protection against unjust discipline is an idea whose time has
long since come. The common law of contract, tort, or even
property needs only a small adjustment to accommodate this
new concept. More to the point, statutory relief for this longneglected abuse of the unorganized worker can now be likened
to a moral imperative for conscientious legislators and for all
those who labor in the field of industrial relations.
This is not "uncharted territory," as some timid courts have
exclaimed. 81 This is terrain that has been carefully mapped in
thousands of arbitration decisions since the Second World War.
That body of arbitral precedent and a large and potentially
much larger body of arbitrators stand ready to be drawn upon
in the forging of a new set of statutory guarantees. The debates
that remain over this detail or that detail should not obscure one
central fact. In the 15 years or so since Blades enunciated his
78 Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965),
51.
79Mich. draft bill, §8(1).
80 Summers, supra note 7, at 522.
81 Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 174, 319 A.2d 174 ( 1974).
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thesis, many other experts have joined the chorus. Not a single
respected and disinterested voice has been heard to suggest
there is any valid, substantial reason for opposing the requirement of just cause. 82 No such reason has been suggested, in my
judgment, because there is none.
CommentHENRY

B.

EPSTEIN*

We have heard three excellent and interesting descriptions of
novel experiments designed to give a measure of job security to
unorganized workers.
In my opinion, careful analysis will show that these are the
exceptions which prove the rule. In the American labor-management situation, there is no effective substitute for the protections given a discharged employee by a well-written and administered discharge and arbitration section and an active union. In
order to compare the present situation in an organized company
with the novel cases described today, I have to review the
benefits of unionized grievance procedures, as I see them.
The first and most important factor is the general labor-management climate. Employees who might be discharged in an
arbitrary fashion in an unorganized employment situation will
usually be treated differently in a unionized environment-depending on the labor-management climate at that time.
Job security for unionized employees encompasses much
more than the submission of unsettled discharges to final and
binding arbitration. The process includes negotiating the exact
language under which discharges are permitted, careful training
of stewards and union staff on the contract language, use of a
multistep grievance procedure with emphasis on settling cases
at the lowest possible level, screening cases for arbitration,
screening arbitrators, actually presenting the arbitration case,
82 At the time I first uttered these words in Maui, I believed them to be literally true.
I underestimated the Academy membership's almost infinite capacity for differences of
opinion. Immediately several "respected and disinterested" voices were heard to challenge the whole concept ofa law requiring ''.just cause" for the discipline of unorganized
employees-primarily, as I understand it, for the reasons mentioned in the text accompanying notes 44-46, supra. But I have decided to let my original phrasing stand; at least
to date no one has seen fit to commit his contrary views to the permanency of print.
*Special Representative, American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Honolulu, Hawaii.
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and finally, paying for the arbitrator, transcripts, lost wages, and
other expenses.
As one who has spent almost all of my working life in the labor
movement, I obviously think this is a good system that works
well for the average discharged union member. It is not a perfect
system. As those of you in the audience know, unions vary in
effectiveness in their handling of discharge cases. It also has to
be pointed out that the decision to take a case to arbitration is
a political one.
However, the political situation in a union works to the discharged employee's advantage. The political pressure is on the
union to back up the discharged member and get favorable
results. It is very difficult for a union to refuse to take a discharge
case to arbitration.
How does this compare to the novel cases described today?

The British Experience
As Professor Hepple points out very well, the British approach to notice of dismissals and grounds for dismissal is much
different from the American one. Unions in Britain have not
negotiated discharge and arbitration procedures similar to our
typical American union agreement. Instead, anger about unfair
dismissals has been expressed in wildcat walkouts by union
members. I must say that this sounds as if it's good for the union
members' emotions, though it must be tough on the overall
labor-management situation.
After reading Professor Hepple's excellent paper, I get the
impression that the British legislation is really an attempt to
have a government body serve as an extension of union agreements to take care of unfair dismissal cases. The British tribunals perform the same functions as arbitrators perform in the
American system.
The British legislation excludes coverage for employees in
their first year of employment and completely excludes all employers with 20 or less employees. It is very possible that the
most unfair discharges occur at small business establishments,
and they are completely uncovered under this scheme.
The system obviously has the advantage of forcing employers
to adopt clear rules on employee conduct and to be careful and
build up a solid case before discharging an employee. In my
experience, this is the same effect a union agreement has on a
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newly organized employer. Clear and fair policies on discharge
are a two-edged sword, but inevitable when procedures exist to
give greater protection to employees.
Professor Hepple points out that most cases are resolved informally, before coming to a formal hearing. The bottom line is
that very few employees win their cases before the tribunals and
that enforcement of decisions is difficult, except in industries
where unions are strong. Even under the British experiment, the
well-organized unions give their members a benefit which is
greater than that available to unorganized workers.
Northrop Corporation

As Mr. Littrell points out, the Northrop experiment is unique.
I find it hard to believe that many other companies would agree
in advance to pay the entire cost of an arbitrator who may overturn an important management decision.
I have no reason to doubt the sincerity and good intentions
of Northrop and the working of the grievance and arbitration
system. The company admits candidly that the procedure has
helped to keep the unions out.
The policy permits employees to appeal the application of
company policy in their cases, but the employees have no say in
the adoption of company policy.
The aggrieved employee is advised by employee relations
representatives who "walk a thin line on a hard road," according
to Mr. Littrell. There is now recognition that the employee is at
a disadvantage in the presentation of a formal arbitration case
and there are attempts being made now to improve that situation.
There appear to be several pluses in the system, as described
by Mr. Littrell. It does emphasize getting settlements at the
lowest possible level, and the existence of a grievance procedure
with teeth does keep management on its toes. The test, it seems
to me, comes when there is a major challenge to company decisions. How do those well-educated and diplomatic personnel
men who walk a thin line react when top management says,
"You've got to decide which side you're on"? Another test must
come when dealing with the troublesome employee-the one
with a lot of complaints and grievances. Does he get full and
enthusiastic representation, or is he counseled to leave the company because he doesn't really fit in?
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Northrop is giving its employees many of the benefits and
procedures of a union agreement without the need to have a
union. An interesting subject for a research project would be to
determine whether it would have been cheaper for Northrop to
have become unionized and to have worked out these procedures through normal collective bargaining. I suspect it would
have been better for the ulcers of those employee relations reps
walking a thin line in the personnel department.
Professor St. Antoine's Overview

Professor St. Antoine's presentation is a comprehensive overview of all possible considerations in connection with unjust
discipline. Because of its comprehensive nature, it's possible to
easily find something to agree with and something to question
in the paper.
The review points to the three categories of American workers who presently have protection against unfair discipline. An
interesting sidelight is that unionized public employees are in
two of the three categories. The first public employee collective
bargaining agreement I negotiated in Hawaii gave an employee
the option of choosing whether to use the contractual grievance
procedure or the established civil service appeal procedure.
Professor St. Antoine then estimates the number of employees who are terminated every year without any protection
or rights. Several court cases are cited to point to a growing
trend of courts to protect employees who have been unfairly
disciplined. To me, these cases sound like isolated cases in
which a sympathetic judge grasped at straws to help an employee who was obviously unfairly treated.
A lot of the thought in the presentation follows the theme of
giving unorganized workers the protections and benefits unions
have built up for their members over the years.
Consciously or unconsciously, every union negotiator goes
through many of the same processes employed by Professor St.
Antoine. Even if the negotiator is using a model contract from
union headquarters, there are certain key points to watch. For
example, a good contract section should cover not only discharge, because there are other forms of serious discipline. Be
sure to write in "all" discipline or itemize: "discharge, suspension, demotion, etc." Also, a discipline section is meaningless
unless there is strong language about layoffs, so that a layoff
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can't be used as a hidden way to get rid of an unwanted employee. Then there's the problem of coverage. Over the union's
objections, probationary employees are usually excluded, so try
to make the probationary period as short as possible.
A well-rounded approach is going to require going over all
these grounds that have been travelled earlier by the unions. If
the goal is to bring a measure ofjustice to employees previously
unprotected, I find it hard to justify excluding employees of
small businesses and middle management. They are probably
the ones who need the protection more than other groups.
I agree with Professor St. Antoine that this is not a matter for
the courts to handle. Placing these new functions in existing
government agencies will also create problems. Look at the
tremendous backlog of EEOC cases. Agencies like the Legal Aid
Society and the Public Defender often find themselves plagued
with huge caseloads, tiny budgets, and inexperienced staffs.
I really question the assumption that this is an idea whose time
has come. Legislation to prohibit discrimination because of
race, sex, religion, and age came slowly and only after major
pushes by interested constituencies. It is still not adequately
enforced and will probably face a weakening in the present
political climate. If some of the laws are not repealed, they will
be weakened by budget cuts and indifferent enforcement.
If you took a public opinion poll today and asked people
whether they felt "unjust dismissals" should be controlled, you
would probably get a very high percentage of yeses. If you asked
the same people: "Do you think that an American businessman
should have the right to manage his business efficiently and
remove people he feels are interfering with the efficiency of his
business?" you would probably also get a large "Yes."
Because of this contradictory thinking, I question whether this
is really an idea whose time has come.

Probable Union Position
Would American unions support legislation similar to the
British law, if it were introduced in Congress?
It would be hard not to support such a measure. Unions would
support such a proposal for the same reasons that they support
minimum wage legislation, national health insurance, OSHA,
and antidiscrimination legislation. Most antidiscrimination crusades have originated elsewhere and then received the support
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of the labor movement. Sometimes this is with mixed feelings,
as when the affirmative action movement conflicts with traditional union positions on seniority.
The American labor movement does have a social conscience.
It still sees itself as the spokesman for all working people, organized and unorganized.
While American unions would probably support such a proposal, I do not see such a plan succeeding in the immediate
future. I don't see any great enthusiasm among unions for such
a change since the membership is pretty well protected by the
present contract language and procedures. And, in all honesty,
I cannot see the Reagan Administration and a conservative Congress supporting a proposal for another government agency and
greater restrictions on American business.

